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The topic of how country size influences a country’s economic performance has received 
renewed interest lately, especially with Rose (2006)— who found no clear pattern between a country’s 
size and its economic performances at the world level . However, when assessing economic 
performances of euro area countries, a “size divide” emerges between small, well faring and reform-
implementing economies on the one hand, and bigger laggard economies on the other. I explain this 
phenomenon, first by the structural higher efficiency of the euro zone smaller economies and second 
by the institutional settings of the euro zone—namely, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
policy led by the European Central Bank (ECB).In this respect, this paper follows and completes some 
of the arguments made by Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006). To empirically test these “political 
economy” hypotheses, I use panel data from 1998 to 2008 for the fifteen countries of the euro zone. 
The econometric analysis confirms structural differences between small and large economies of the 
euro zone and growth strategies of small countries are proved more efficient in the framework of the 













INTRODUCTION: STYLIZED FACTS ON THE EURO ZONE AND THE SIZE DIVIDE 
The topic of how country size influences a country’s economic performance has received 
renewed interest lately, especially with Rose (2006)—who found that size does not seem to determine 
economic performance in one way or another (with the exception of a correlation between small size 
and trade openness). However, when assessing economic performances of euro area
1 countries, a “size 
divide” emerges between small, well faring and reform-implementing economies on the one hand and 
bigger laggard economies on the other. Indeed the topic of country size and its effects in the monetary 
union is a developing field for economic research and fits into the larger one of the study of 
heterogeneities and their consequences in a monetary union. Sources of heterogeneity in the euro zone 
are manifold: economic, political, institutional, cultural, to name only a few, and represent as many 
challenges for ambitious common policies and the institutions implementing them. I will focus on the 
economic consequences of different country sizes—sources of structural heterogeneity— in the 
framework of the monetary union.  
Before we delve into our analysis of country size and its economic implications in the euro zone, let us 
start with some stylised facts of the economic performances of euro zone members in relation with 
their size. The discrepancies, these stylised facts highlight motivate this paper and base the assumption 
of a “size divide” in the euro zone—a concept on which we will elaborate in the following sections. 
What we call economic performance is measured by four indicators: the growth rate, the inflation rate, 
the unemployment rate, the external balance. (In other words, the components of Kaldor’s magic 
square, 1971). We also add government general structural balances as this is a key feature of the EMU. 
Our timeframe covers the last decade (1998-2008) and so starts one year before the launch of the final 
phase of the monetary union.  
As a proxy for country size we take population (as in Rose, 2006 and other empirical works on this 
topic) so that out of 15 countries, Germany, France and Italy qualify as big, others are considered 
“small” (other rankings and determinants of country size will be discussed in the following section). In 
Graphs 1 to 6, we observe inverse relationships between country size and GDP growth, inflation, 
external balance and general government balances as well as a positive one between country size and 
unemployment (see graphs 1-5), so that one can talk of a “size divide” in the euro zone in terms of 





1 In this paper euro area, euro zone and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) all denote the fifteen countries of the 
euro zone as of January 2008 and will be used interchangeably. Confusingly enough all members of the European Union are 
part of the Economic and Monetary Union, but at different stages! When referring to EMU, we thus mean the countries of the 
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Of course our aim is not to claim that the relationship between sound economic performance and 
country size is a perfect inverse one in the euro zone. It would be foolish to draw a black and white 
picture especially when such complex interactions between politics and economics are at play. The 
graphs speak for themselves as they display various regression fits and the inner country variance of 
the data is sometimes even larger than that between different countries. Undeniably each country is a 
peculiar case per se; however it is possible to identify groups. Outliers are in the first place new euro 
zone entrants—Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. These small countries are still in a phase of catching up 
and so are bound to differ from their Benelux counterparts or Ireland. To a lesser extent, Greece and 
Portugal do not fit the “size divide” picture as these small countries are still in the process of 
overcoming the competitiveness drop the euro parity entailed. 
That being said, there is already a literature highlighting this size divide in the euro zone. Laurent and 
Le Cacheux (2006) run an analysis of the impact of size within the euro zone based on Mill's 
reciprocal demand theory which states that when reaping the benefits of international trade the small 
and open country has a structural advantage over the bigger and relatively closed one. Their 
econometric results highlight a systematic negative correlation between large size and sound economic 
performance with regards to growth, inflation, public deficit and unemployment between 1996 and 
2004.Similarly, Feldmann (2006) showed that country size in the EU and unemployment are 
positively correlated. 
This paper furthers the analysis of the interactions between country size and economic performance in 
the euro zone. To this purpose, I describe different specifications for country size and detail the 
structures and benefits it determines within both the EU and EMU (Section 1). I then sketch a brief 
political economy of size in the euro zone, that is I examine how country size impacts on the conduct 
of economic policy with focus on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) (Section 2). Subsequently, I test the hypotheses previously presented running a thorough 
econometric analysis (Section 3) before concluding. 
 
SECTION 1: COUNTRY SIZE IN THE EMU: DEFINITIONS, STRUCTURES, BENEFITS 
Country size: definitions and relativity 
History had it that the European Union be composed of countries of very different demographic and 
economic sizes. Population varies from 400.000 inhabitants (Malta) to some 82 millions (Germany); 
GDP (2007 figures) from roughly €5000 million to €2500 billion for the same countries. Country size 
encompasses a large number of dimensions: territory, demography, economic and political power. One 
of the core difficulties of our analysis is that the relationships between these dimensions are not linear. 
Large countries maybe sparsely populated and the other way around for instance. Consequently one 
may rank countries in almost as many ways as there are indicators. While GDP is a good measure of 
economic power (and not necessarily of economic development which is better captured by GDP per COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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capita), population proves to be a better proxy for country size for our economic analysis. Indeed 
explaining economic performance by resorting to GDP is somewhat tautological and bound to create 
endogeneity problems. 
A crucial point already highlighted by Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) is that country size and its 
impact in the euro zone are to be understood in relative terms. Indeed in absolute terms, Germany, 
France and Italy are medium countries, only the euro zone or the European Union taken as a whole 
would qualify as “big” in the world economy. But in the euro zone, these three countries make up 70% 
of the GDP of the area and so are labelled “big”. Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) adopted the 
following classification: countries with a population up to a quarter of the most populated Member 
State fall into the small category; up to a half, into the medium; more than a half into the large one. By 
this token in the euro zone, there are three big countries—Germany, France, Italy—, one medium—
Spain—, the rest being small countries. The recent adhesion of Cyprus and Malta also prompts the 
question whether an additional “extra small” category should be added. However in terms of 
population Luxembourg would also fall into that category despite a much bigger economic size. For 
the purpose of clarity we will consider only three different size groups according to population figures.  
 
Country size and economic structures 
Now that we have specified country size in different ways, let us turn to its impact on the economic 
structures of countries. Following Salmond (2006), one can define large countries as countries 
accounting for a large part of EMU economic activity, tending to act as price makers on this market. 
Conversely, small countries represent a low proportion of the EMU economy and behave as price 
takers.  
By and large, small countries tend to be more open to trade (this has been documented on numerous 
occasions, most notably by Rodrik, 1998 and Alesina et al., 2005), while large ones rely more on 
internal demand for growth. It follows that small countries are more vulnerable to external 
developments and more prone to lead competitiveness strategies in order to expand exports. In larger 
countries, policy makers must address internal stabilisation. This is one of the core structural 
differences between the two groups but this is a blunt picture: on the international level, large euro 
zone economies are in fact only middle size economies coping simultaneously with what we defined 
as small and large countries challenges. They are not big enough not to care about their 
competitiveness and too big to care only about it and sacrifice internal stabilisation. 
The graphs 6 and 7 illustrate the structural differences in terms of openness (ratio of the sum of 
exports and imports to GDP), and domestic demand (as a percentage of GDP) as components of the 
economy between small and large countries of the euro zone. Trade openness offers a more clear-cut 
inverse relationship than domestic demand does.  
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An additional structural difference stems from small countries’ vulnerability to international 
conditions. The smallness of their own domestic market does not allow them to lose exports share and 
so they are bound to produce and implement economic change in a more efficient manner. 
One has also argued that smaller countries, having more homogenous population and smaller 
territories to control, have better institutions and are more prone to reach political consensus as 
documented in Robinson (1960) for instance. To illustrate this efficiency advantage of small countries, 
I have computed measures of output or similarly productivity per square kilometre. This gives a 
picture of what I refer to as “territorial efficiency”. The importance of territory effects has indeed 
been highlighted by the new economic geography approach (Krugman, 1991). While it posits the 
importance of increasing returns to scale and thus a priori bestows an advantage to large countries, it 
also takes into account the location, structure and density of “economic activity” (usually higher in 
smaller countries). With this measure, I intend to depart from a mono-variable representation of 
country size. Using population as a proxy for economic size is convenient in that the relationship 
between population and GDP is roughly linear. (In other words, when one ranks euro zone countries in 
terms of population or GDP, the results are roughly similar.) However, as stated earlier, country size 
encompasses several dimensions. Besides, a population alone does not make an economy: key 
ingredients also include material resources and a territory. Hence the need to sophisticate our analysis 
by adding two additional size rationales—GDP and surface area—as the ratio of economic size over 
geographic size. Again, because countries are differently ranked along the population, GDP and 
territory dimensions, this measure does not provide a straightforward “size ranking” as population 
does and should not be understood as such. Instead, it is meant to capture countries’ structural 
differences in terms of economic organisation over a given territory. Graphs 8 and 9 offer a snapshot 
picture of territorial efficiency. According to the indicator chosen, rankings differ. However one may 
note the relative territorial inefficiency of small southern and new Member States, the medium 
territorial efficiency of the big three, and the higher efficiency of the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 










For this analysis, I retain the rather simple ratio of GDP over land area (output per 1000km
2) as a 
measure for territorial efficiency
2. This measure is far from perfect and one should be aware that it can 
be driven up or down by a relatively small, respectively large, territory (as compared with the size of 
the economy) as the polar cases of Malta and France highlight. But it offers a relevant picture of the 
density of economic activity and of where there is still room and potential for improvement. Graph 12 
allows us to distinguish between three groups. First those with high territorial efficiency are made up 
of the Benelux countries and Malta. The former are located at the very heart of the Blue Banana (or 
the European economic core that spans from Southern England to England via the Rhine region) and 
are typically very open and efficient small economies; it goes without saying that their smallness does 
not leave room for territorially extensive growth. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the least 
territorially efficient group, mostly made up of countries that are either new and less developed 
entrants (Cyprus, Slovenia) or still catching up in terms of economic structures (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain). Germany performs well but is certainly advantaged by its relatively small territory (the fourth 
in the European Union). The middle group comprises the following four countries Austria, France, 
Ireland and Italy. France and Italy, the two large countries of this group have different territorial 
structures: France still develops decentralisation policies to overcome Paris’ macrocephaly, while Italy 
displays a denser network of industrial centres, it is struggling with obsolete industrial structures and 
the South is still lagging behind. Ireland and Austria are the two small countries with intermediate 
territorial efficiency: Austria lies at the heart of continental Europe and has based a development 
strategy that fully takes advantage of its geographical situation as it became a hub for exchanges and 
investment with the new East European Members. Ireland also certainly internalised its geographical 
situation: it overcame its relative remoteness and isolation by leading an attractive fiscal policies for 
multinationals and outsourced service centres. There remain two peculiar outliers: Malta is here 
                                                            
2 Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs (1999) develop a similar indicator: GDP density, calculated by multiplying GDP per 
capita by the number of people per square kilometer. COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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pushed up by its very small territory, and conversely Finland pulled down by its large one, so that we 
cannot correctly presume of their respective territorial efficiency.  
 















As for how territorial efficiency is related to GDP growth, graph 10 offers a mixed picture that only 
reflects our topic’s complexity as a number of variables are interacting at the national and euro zone 
levels to explain national discrepancies in terms of economic performance. However, it is clear that if 
a country experiences a protracted period of GDP growth, the ratio of GDP to surface area will also 
rise overtime and because it is less sensitive to cyclical fluctuations (indeed GDP is an economic 
aggregate and we do not include growth variations in this ratio), it offers a more structural or long 
term oriented picture of a country’s economic evolution. Strikingly enough, over the decade we study 
(1998-2008), a majority of countries stagnate in terms of territorial efficiency and only small 
economies (the Benelux countries, Ireland and Malta) see it increase—with the notable exception of 
Germany, that phenomenon being possibly explained by its wage moderation policy as well as the 
catching up of the new Bundesländer.   
Adding this territorial efficiency dimension to our panel enables us to flesh out our analysis of country 
size and economic performance as it captures what is done at the national level on a given territory 
with its human and material resources. Also the fact that the relationship between territorial efficiency 
and country size (taken as population) is not evidently positive or negative is an asset for our analysis 
as it will prevent the occurrence of simplistic or caricatured results with regards to the economic 
effects of country size.  
 
As pointed out by Buisan and Restoy (2006), causes of divergences in economic performance are also 
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“size conditioned” reaction. For instance, the sensitivity to external demands shocks depends on 
openness which as we saw depends on size. In the euro zone, the less open countries are France, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece; the more open being Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands. Likewise oil 
prices shocks affect the three big countries according to similar dependency ratios, ratios that are 
higher in small countries like Greece, Portugal, Belgium and Spain. Export specialisation is also an 
important source of heterogeneity in reactions to external shocks, but identifying a size pattern here 
proves harder. Germany for instance, as we will detail in the next section, has an export specialisation 
that differs significantly from those of its French or Italian counterparts. 
 
  Structural heterogeneity and convergence 
We have briefly described the heterogeneities in terms of size of the euro zone Member States and 
how these translate into heterogeneous economic structures and reaction patterns. Nevertheless, 
common policies of the European Union and in particular the Economic and Monetary Union are 
based on the premise of convergence in nominal (guaranteed by the Maastricht criteria) as well as in 
real terms (The process seems to have taken a halt since the late 1990s.). One assumed that legally 
binding Member States into nominal convergence would also prompt their convergence in real terms. 
Indeed, a shared pool of interests and structures is necessary to implement and sustain any common 
policy. This assumed convergence legitimates resorting to “one-size-fits-all” rules. The problem is that 
real convergence has taken a halt in the last decade. Member States are also considered equally 
sovereign and thus of course granted the same status. This furthers the non-acknowledgement of size 
differences in EU and EMU institutional rules. We will see, in this section and the following, how this 
leads to an unequal repartition of the gain and losses of euro zone membership. 
 
  The EU and EMU frameworks bestow small countries institutional advantages...  
Because of their greater vulnerability to external developments and so potentially to the institutions of 
European Union (whereas internal shocks are a greater issue for large countries) and the fear they be 
smothered by larger countries, smaller countries have been granted a number of advantages and 
protections upon joining the European Union. Interestingly enough, at its creation the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) included the “three big” and three small countries, so that one 
comprehends, why then, these guarantees really mattered. The original six have mechanically have 
had more opportunities to influence the institutional system in their favour; and while there was only 
one large country left (the United Kingdom) to join the EU, there were plenty of small ones. The 
institutional protections bestowed to small countries are unanimity ruling; the generalised search for 
consensus even if it is not legally necessary; overrepresentation in voting rights granted relative to 
population figures; the possibility to form blocking minorities (and as each enlargement changes the 
relative power of each Member State, it automatically increases the number of possible coalitions, thus COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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augmenting the likelihood that small countries impact on collective decisions); the Commission’s 
logistical help and recognition of special interests (Luxembourg in banking, Cyprus in shipping, etc). 
In terms of political and decision-making power, EU membership enables these small states to punch 
above their weight. Rose (2006) highlighted the new sovereignty scale for small countries within the 
EU. Conversely large states are shrunk, especially Germany. The overrepresentation of small states 
and conversely the shrinkage of large ones can be precisely assessed: Laurent (2006) showed that 70% 
of the economic size of the EU was represented by 40% of its political size, this discrepancy holding 
paradoxically also for the EMU, where political cooperation is sizeably deeper.  
The alliance strategies of small countries vary overtime according to their national interest. Some 
rally with a bigger neighbour to carry more clout, others go it alone and sometimes turn against one 
another as is often the case between Belgium and the Netherlands (especially on the issue of voting 
rights). In the diverse fields of the European Union policies, there is almost never a clear split line 
between large and small countries. One seldom occurrence though, seems to be macroeconomic policy 
and the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. It has often been argued by small countries 
that the sanctions have been delivered with double standards, as the two big offenders France and 
Germany were pardoned and smaller offenders (Greece, Portugal) treated less mercifully. This is a 
widespread but erroneous impression that ignores the fact that Greece and Portugal (contrary to France 
and Germany) were punished for communicating tampered statistics and signalling their excessive 
deficits too late. However, the fact that smaller members of the EMU rose up in arms to defend the 
Stability and Growth Pact allegedly against the larger sinful Member States (the Netherlands, Austria, 
Finland and Spain voted for sanctions to be carried out against France and Germany) illustrates the 
fact that the size divide is at play precisely in the economic policy realm. 
 
  ...which turn into economic gains  
Casella (1995) asks the question of whether “there are systematic forces such that countries of 
different sizes participating in a free trade bloc gain differently from the entry of new members”. 
Assuming increasing economies of scale, she shows that not big countries (where firms enjoy lower 
costs) but small countries (whose internal market and competitiveness increases with enlargement) 
benefit more from enlargement because the domestic markets of large countries proportionally shrink 
with each enlargement. In fact the increase in internal market will be more significant for firms in 
small countries than for firms in big countries, and the same goes for competitiveness. The EU, as it 
plays down the importance of the size of the domestic market in offering its members access to a very 
large single market, clearly favours the development of small countries (for which domestic market 
size was the weakness to overcome) over that of bigger ones (for which domestic market size used to 
be one of the main assets).  
Furthering Casella’s analysis, Baldinger and Breuss (2006), however, argue that this small country 
bonus is not significantly larger than the advantages of large countries in terms of high-market power COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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and terms of trade, market size, group ties, endowments in human capital and technologies, product 
varieties, and scale economies. Thus different economic forces are at play in the distribution of the 
gains of trade bloc enlargement without one dominating the others, leaving the outcome in terms of 
country size undetermined.  
Furceri and Karras (2007), also underline that small size is positively correlated with business cycle 
volatility, which explains part of the small Member States vulnerability but also their larger gains from 
the EMU, as business cycles are anchored. 
All in all, small protected states gain economic and political power in entering the EU and the EMU, 
while the contrary goes for large ones. For instance, before joining the euro no small country had a 
currency that could be used as a “monetary weapon”. Conversely Germany gave up a lot with the 
deutschmark: not only an international currency, but also the ability for the government to borrow at 
lower rates than their European peers. With the euro, Germany has lost this exclusive comparative 
advantage, while small countries gained lower interest rates and greater credibility. As Robinson 
(1960) pointed out, referring to large countries’ advantages in terms of defence: large countries hold a 
comparative advantage in terms of public good provision as long as they do not share it. In short, one 
may contend that larger countries—especially Germany— traded monetary weapons (the deutschmark 
against the euro) and economic advantages (undisputed leadership against reinforced economic 
stability outside German borders) in joining the EMU, while small countries made a net gain in terms 
of economic power and protection. 
Now that we have studied how the general frameworks of the EU and EMU favour small countries, it 
is time we turn to the conduct of economic policy and examine how country size interacts with the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the policy of the European Central Bank. 
SECTION 2: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SIZE IN THE EURO ZONE 
 
The European Union or for that matter, even the Economic and Monetary Union cannot be 
considered as a solely economic organisation. Their political essence makes a sheer economic analysis 
of their functioning obtuse. I will not for instance level criticism at the functioning of the euro zone on 
the basis that it is not an optimal currency area. The creation of the monetary union was 
overwhelmingly motivated by political reasons, not by optimality in the economic theory sense. As the 
previous section casted a light on how politics and institutions mar economic outcomes it is sensible to 
now sketch a political economy of size in the euro zone. In other words, examine how country size as 
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  The ‘instrument gap’ and the conduct of economic policy 
Economic policy is carried out with the help of instruments: in the EMU, as explained by Milewski 
(2004), there is a double specialisation of instruments (monetary and fiscal) and objectives (inflation 
and growth), which is, as we will see, in many regards suboptimal. There is also a commensuration 
problem between the goals assigned to these instruments and their scope, an ‘instrument gap’ so to 
speak. Certainly, the 3% deficit permit and a central bank addressing almost exclusively excessive 
inflation are meagre tools to resort to high unemployment rates and sluggish growth. What is striking 
and also motivates the topic of this paper is that the economic policy instruments provided for in the 
settings of the euro zone are precisely those of small countries. The latter are helped by the structural 
activism of the ECB for their competitive growth strategies as open economies.  
Conversely, these same rules forbid big countries to resort to policy instruments they usually favour. 
They can no longer resort to proactive fiscal policies to stabilise the economy or boost demand except 
under exceptional circumstances. That in turn, may explain their relatively poor economic 
performances and so, their reluctance to implement the necessary structural reforms in labour and 
products markets, for these need to be accompanied by stabilisation measures. Consequently, within 
the framework of the EMU, small and large countries face a “strategic asymmetry” (Fitoussi and Le 
Cacheux, 2005) in regards to their growth strategies. Large countries are left with small countries’ 
growth strategies, which bear a much lesser yield for them. Fitoussi and Le Cacheux (2005) explain 
that the competitiveness gains acquired through wage moderation have substantial positive effects in 
small countries whose exports and capital flows depend largely on external demand, and the other way 
around, the same policies are less effective in large countries where exports and capital inflows are 
less sensitive to cost differentials and their effect on GDP relatively smaller. Additionally, while 
domestic competitive gains have strong supply side effect in small countries, they flower internal 
inflation in large countries and thus push their real interest rate up.  
In addition to that and as noted by Calmfors (1998), internal devaluations can substitute for the 
impossibility in a monetary union, to devaluate the currency or drop interest rates. Fiscal policy (also 
encompassing tax policy) should take up the function of “switching expenditures between foreign and 
domestic output, just as an exchange-rate change does”. By this token, a cut in employers’ payroll tax 
would decrease labour costs and thus affect exports, output and employment like a currency 
devaluation would. The loss in government income (from the tax cut) can be recovered by a rise in 
other taxes, such as the VAT. This kind of policy raises several issues. First, the up- and downward 
flexibility of the internal exchange rate is probably too limited to substitute for the loss of national 
monetary policies because of wage rigidities. Second, the political cost of an internal devaluation may 
also be prohibitive. Third and more importantly, internal devaluations are also akin to currency 
devaluations in their harmful international effects as they boost national exports and penalise imports. 
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The next subsection illustrates how Germany has been carrying out such an internal devaluation policy 
over the last few years.  
 
  Up against the wall: the German example 
In that respect, Germany is a case in point: the wage moderation or internal devaluation strategy it has 
followed for a decade (partly to compensate the loss of competitiveness caused by reunification), did 
not have trickle down effects on internal demand and even in a way led to the actual social strife as 
many workers had to renounce to pay rises. Needless to say that Germany’s economic policy has been 
detrimental to its euro zone partners. For instance, the three-point increase of the VAT (January 2007) 
was earmarked as such: one point to replace social contribution and two points to finance the decrease 
in the tax rate on firms from 25% to 15%, thus furthering international tax competition. As Graph 11 
illustrates, Germany’s exports boomed (openness overshot from 55% to almost 90%, a figure usually 
found in small countries) over the last decade, while domestic demand has been on the wane. 
Germany’s exports performance was hailed as the “German comeback” but as noted by the Economist 
(“The teetotallers’ hangover”, December 6
th 2008), “a persistent current-account surplus is a symptom 















So that in following a typical small country export-led growth strategy at the expense of domestic 
demand in particular its consumer spending component (domestic demand is made up of final 
consumption, investment of the private sector and the government, and stocks), Germany has made 
itself more vulnerable to external crises. Even fiscal virtue and high saving ratios cannot shelter the 
German economy from negative external demand shocks. All in all, Germany is engaging in a tax and 
labour costs- race to the bottom. In doing so, it competes with other EMU countries, not with 
emerging ones, so that if it wins anything in the process (external and domestic market shares), it will 
be at the expense of other Member States. As underlined by Cochard (2008), the improvement of the COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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German trade balance since 2001 was mostly made against France and Italy, not Asia
3. Strikingly 
enough, over the same period unit labour costs, trade openness, domestic demand in France—roughly 
equal to those of Germany at the onset of the 2000s— follow opposite paths. This beggar-thy-
neighbour policy is not even propitious for Germany itself as it depresses internal demand
4, which in 
turn depresses the whole of EMU, as German GDP accounts for one-third of that of the EMU. The risk 
is that all EMU countries embark on such strategies and aggregate demand will falter, dragging down 
growth along. 
 
  Country size and the economic government of the euro zone 
We have briefly evoked the adverse effects of EMU institutional setting on the policies of large 
countries. Let us now carry a more thorough analysis with regards to the two main devices of 
economic policy in the euro zone, namely the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). 
 
  The Stability and Growth Pact and the global demand externality 
The Stability and Growth Pact was designed with the launch of the monetary union on the tenet that 
fiscal externalities had to be contained so as not to jeopardise the conduct of a common monetary 
policy (through a raise of the common interest rate). One agreed on the threshold limits of respectively 
3% and 60% of GDP for the public deficit and the public debt, as it seemed to accommodate the 
figures of the time. The Pact has received numerous criticisms and was reformed in March 2005 in 
order to (among others) better take into account the cyclical position and national peculiarities when 
assessing the deficit, but it did not change in essence. We have seen that it represents a bigger burden 
for larger states in regards to countercyclical fiscal policies restrictions; the benefits they may reap 
from enhanced fiscal credibility are also relatively smaller.  
But let us come back to the negative externality containment logic behind the SGP. It prevents that 
bigger countries may impose the consequences of their fiscal policies on others. In that sense, smaller 
countries have rose up in arms against the alleged fiscal laxness of their larger counterparts. Indeed 
fiscal consolidation is not necessarily easier for smaller countries. As noted by Bonnaz (2003), the 
relative easiness of fiscal consolidation applies only to very open small economies such as Ireland, 
Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands since their public finances Keynesian multiplier is lower. But 
small countries such as Greece, Finland or Spain have conditions that are similar to those of France 
and Germany. Nonetheless it does not mean they have been more virtuous from a common interest 
perspective, Bonnaz (2003) emphasizes the need to consider “global demand”. Indeed, through their 
higher inflation they are responsible for more negative externalities as their bigger counterparts 
                                                            
3 Cochard (2008) further details that German exports’ shares outside of the European market actually declined even if 
this was at milder rates than for the exports’ shares of their Euro zone counterparts. 
4 Cochard (2008) again highlights that the German contribution of internal demand to GDP growth was halved between 
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through their “lax” fiscal stance. Small countries benefit from an asymmetry in real interest rates 
within the monetary union and generate a sizeable inflation externality
5 (Spain, Ireland are among the 
countries with higher inflation rates) which is not internalised by way of sanctions and is a real burden 
for larger countries of the euro zone that have to put up with less favourable real interest rates. The 
ECB monitors inflation rates and may issue warnings but it cannot carry out sanctions as in the 
excessive deficit procedure. There is thus a clear institutional imbalance that favours smaller countries 
free-riding on the common monetary policy while larger countries are disempowered of their 
traditional economic policy instruments by the SGP.  
 
  The European Central Bank and country size  
Similarly to other EU institutions, economic size is blatantly misrepresented in the ECB’s decision 
instances as there is, once again, a clear mismatch between the political and economic weights of 
regional governors. The “one country, one vote principle” has led to larger degrees of 
misrepresentation than in the Fed and the Bundesbank (Berger, 2006). What is worse is that 
enlargement of the EMU will accentuate that trend. The 2003 reform—that is the limitation to 15 
national central bankers and 6 board members— attempted to tamper this effect but it will not reverse 
it. Rotation will also help check misrepresentation but will cause discontinuities in voting frequencies 
between large and small countries. Even if our earlier economic definition of small, respectively large, 
countries as price takers, respectively makers may hold here: developments in large countries are 
indeed closely monitored by the ECB and those in small countries unlikely to change its policy stance. 
The underlying tenet that a national representative will systematically push its own country’s interest 
(as is assumed for instance in Dixit and Lambertini (2003)) is moot. As a consequence, the 
representation and governing system of the ECB does not tell us much about the impact of the central 
bank’s policies on countries of different sizes as the decisions processes are not public and one can 
only speculate about what goes on behind closed doors.  
To analyse how country size and the policy led by the ECB interact, one should consider the impact of 
country size in the classical output/inflation trade-off or Phillips Curve. That trade-off is affected by 
openness and so possibly by country size (as the three big are relatively more closed and a number of 
small economies—among which those of Benelux—are significantly more open). In fact, Sanchez 
(2006) documented that small countries, because of their greater openness and larger inflation effects, 
tend to have a steeper supply curve and conversely, larger countries a flatter one. The monetary union 
is from this perspective more propitious to small countries with steep supply curves, and for larger 
ones, monetary autonomy outperforms monetary union. 
                                                            
5 Bonnaz(2003) calculated that between 1999 and 2002, small countries generated on average 1% more inflation than 
the big three, which given their weight in the euro zone translated into an additional 0.3% to the inflation of the zone. 
Following a Taylor rule, and all other things being equal, the author computed that this pushed interest rates 50 base points 
over their level, had the small countries had similar inflation rates as the large ones.   COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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Additionally, the position of the larger economies is worsened by the single currency: they can no 
longer rely on their exchange rate policies to accommodate structural reforms, thus increasing the 
costs of the latter. Also Sibert and Sutherland (2000) have shown that rigidities vary with the stance of 
monetary policy: the less a central bank engages in stabilisation, the more are nominal rigidities in 
labour markets likely phase out. By the same token (and if we assume this relation holds 
symmetrically), the more the ECB lays the emphasis on macroeconomic stability, the more prone are 
governments to become adverse to structural reforms. This could be one of the perverse effects of 
‘institutionalised virtue’.  
Finally, another pitfall for large euro zone economies with regards to the ECB is analysed by 
Marzinotto (2008). Considering the determinants of wage growth in the EMU, she shows that country 
size (measured by total employment which increases the size of Germany relative to the other big 
countries of the euro zone) plays a part. The relationship she finds is not linear but hump-shaped 
meaning that wage growth is especially restrained in the very big (in this case Germany) and very 
small countries of the monetary union. In her view German wage restraint results from unions’ dread 
of an interest hike by the central bank (which would restrain domestic as well as external demand), 
should they push wages up; and she concludes that “the largest EU labour market, Germany, is 
constrained in a straight-jacket”. (This of course, sheds a different light on the German growth strategy 
and how we previously described it.) As for middle-sized countries, they are not big enough to 
influence euro-area inflation and not small enough to care only about decreasing their labour costs, so 
that their wage growth is on average larger than that of small countries and Germany.  
We have thus explained how the economic government of the euro zone is adverse to growth 
strategies of large countries and conversely boosts those of small one. But this theoretical analysis 




SECTION 3: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
Now that we have explained the workings of the euro zone and how it made country size play a part in 
economic performance from a theoretical viewpoint, it is time we empirically test our arguments.  
 
  The data, the variables and their correlation structure 
The data we use covers the 1998-2008 period for the fifteen countries of the euro zone (though the 
three latest entrants, do not necessarily fit the “size divide” as we previously explained) and comes 
from Eurostat. To measure economic performance we focus on GDP growth. One could argue that the 
indicator is only quantitative and does not necessarily capture the quality of growth (possibly better 
displayed by GDP per capita); however for the purpose of simplicity, we will use it as our dependent 
variable. We further include unemployment, the external balance as a percentage of GDP (Bal_pro) 
and inflation (i.e. the three other components of Kaldor’s magic square) in our correlation structure 
analysis (see Table 1) to complete it.  
To measure country size we rely on population and to a lesser extent population squared so as to test 
whether one may observe quadratic relationship between country size and economic performance (this 
does not prove very conclusive). We also include determinants of economic performance we believe 
are either negatively (openness, the general government structural balance) or positively (domestic 
demand) correlated with country size. 
The correlation structure displayed in Table 1 shows negative correlations between indicators of 
country size (population, GDP) and economic performance (GDP growth and unemployment being 
respectively negatively and positively correlated with population). Also the correlation between the 
economic motor of large economies (domestic demand, here taken as a percentage of GDP) and 
economic performance is negative; the deficit gap (ΔDeficit=Budget deficit+3,is negative for countries 
running deficits larger than the 3% limit and positive for those within the Maastricht bounds) is 
positively correlated with growth. This hints at a possible growth impediment for countries relying 
heavily on domestic demand and running large deficits, i.e. usually large countries. Conversely 
openness and the inflation gap (ΔInflation=Inflation rate-2, measures whether the country’s inflation is 
above or under the 2% threshold that the ECB uses to define price stability) are positively correlated 
with growth, which confirms the small countries’ advantages in the euro zone. Domestic demand and 
trade openness are complementary economic aggregates and to some extent superposed (imports are 
also a part of domestic demand for instance); so for the sake of simplicity and to avoid 
misspecification, we use them as alternative controls (i.e. the performance of big countries is regressed 
on domestic demand and that of the smaller ones on trade openness). However as we have seen 
previously, the three large euro zone economies are in fact medium sized economies and our purpose COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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is not to deny their heavy reliance on exports (especially in the German case). Thus, to draw a subtler 
picture, we pay heed to the different intensities with which these two categories of economies depend 
on various economic aggregates for their growth. The correlation structure of our indicator of 
territorial efficiency indicator—output per 1000km
2— is not so straightforward with regards to 
country size but as we have seen earlier (see p.7), it is because the relationship between both variables 
is not linear. 
 
TABLE  1 : CORRELATION STRUCTURE OF VARIABLES 
 









Δ Inflation  Δ Deficit 
GDP  1.0000                 
GDP  growth  -0.4008  1.0000        
Unemployment  0.2759  0.0001  1.0000             
Population 0.9732  -0.3881  0.3945  1.0000      
Trade 
Openness 
-0.4147  0.3261  -0.5177  -0.5278  1.0000         
Domestic 
Demand 




0.1482  -0.2896  -0.3676  0.0589  0.5305  -0.2820  1.0000     
Δ  Inflation  -0.3081 0.2512  -0.1009  -0.2379 0.1095 0.2073  -0.1657 1.0000   
Δ Deficit  -0.2277  0.3839  -0.0840  -0.2694  0.4267  -0.6912  0.0250  -0.1317  1.0000 
 
Graph 12 and 13 cast a light on the fact that openness seems to be a better motor for growth than 
domestic demand in the EMU, thus partly explaining the discrepancies in terms of economic 
performance along the size divide.  
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  Panel data analysis 
In addition to our variables capturing size (population), economic motors (trade openness, domestic 
edmand) and territorial efficiency (output per 1000km
2), ΔInflation or the ‘inflation gap’and ΔDeficit 
or the ‘deficit gap’ (both defined earlier) are meant to reflect the institutional settings of the euro zone 
and how far economies lie away from the macroeconomic stability targets or bounds of the ECB and COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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the Stability and Growth Pact. These variables often bear opposite signs according to whether a 
country is big or small (especially ΔInflation, because of small countries’ inflationist tendencies). 
Larger countries, on the other hand, for reasons we previously detailed, tend to run larger deficits. 
I use panel data to estimate the effects of the previously detailed independent variables on GDP 
growth. The analysis relies on GLS (Generalised Least Squares, so as to obtain the best linear 
unbiased estimators) regressions with fixed effects
67 (FE model) and robust standard errors 
specification for conditional heteroscedasticity of the following form: 
 
 
Where   and  respectively denote country effects and the error term. Population is the population 
for a given country in a given year in millions. Trade Openness is the the sum of exports and imports 
as a percentage of GDP, alternatively we control for Domestic Demand as a percentage of GDP. 
Indeed these two variables, as we explained earlier are roughly speaking either the motor of small or 
large economies and can be seen as converse representations of the same economic aggregate. 
Output_per1000km
2 is the ratio of GDP over surface area and is our measure of territorial efficiency. 
ΔInflation and ΔDeficit are the two measure of inflation and deficit in relation with the policy of the 
ECB and the Maastricht criterion we use to assess the impact of the euro zone “economic government” 
(as we discussed in the precious paragraph). 
The small number of countries oriented our choice for a fixed effect regression—confirmed by a 
Hausman test
8 as well as by high correlation values of the individual intercept term   and the constant 
term. We also introduced time effects so as to possibly capture the effects of a “euro zone business 
cycle”. Using a usual F-test, time effects are proved to be overall significant but not individually, and 
given the limited number of observations and so degrees of freedom, we considered the results less 
relevant (see table in appendix C) and favoured estimations including only individual effects. 
Table 2 presents the results of the GLS regressions for the 1998 to 2008 period, for the fifteen 
countries of the euro zone. Model 1 tests the relationship between growth and country size (taken as 
population); the results confirm a significant inverse relationship. Model 2 adds openness and exhibits 
a positive significant relationship with growth. Model 3 tests an alternative to trade openness with 
domestic demand taken as a percentage of GDP but lacks significance. Model 4 and 5 add territorial 
efficiency to either of these alternative regressions, and model 6 and 7 include the inflation and deficit 
gaps and yield mixed significance results. Overall, coefficients on trade openness are more significant 
than those on domestic demand, also given our assumptions on the different roles they play in the 
                                                            
6 The FE model allows for the intercept term in the regression function to vary over time and space, while the slope 
estimates are constrained across units. 
7. Additionally the panel was checked for serial autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors, as this particular issue proves 
problematic for fixed effects regressions as explained in Drukker (2003).  
8 The Hausman test indicates that the individual effects and our explanatory variables are related, so that the fixed 
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growth strategies of small versus large countries, it is sensible to run regressions for both groups and 
see whether these differences are empirically confirmed.   
 
TABLE  2 : REGRESSION TABLE FOR DETERMINANTS OF GDP GROWTH IN THE EURO ZONE, 1998-2008 
GLS with fixed effects for panel data, robust to heteroscedasticity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Observations  162 160 145 160 145 119 108 
R
2 within  0.0564 0.0774 0.0509  0.164 0.0510  0.365  0.262 
sigma_u  12.54 13.95 12.99 11.28 13.23 11.42 20.08 
sigma_e  1.370 1.366 1.371 1.305 1.376 1.091 1.141 
rho  0.988 0.991 0.989 0.987 0.989 0.991 0.997 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; Data: Eurostat. 
 
 
Assessing the ‘size divide’ 
To capture the structural effects of country size on growth and test our ‘size divide’ hypothesis, we run 
the same regression as before separately for big and small countries (Spain is dropped as it is the only 
middle-sized country falling in neither categories). Table 3 details the results for large countries: 
country size gains significance confirming our inverse relationship hypothesis. Since openness was not 
always significant, in line with the fact that large countries are comparatively more closed, we dropped 
the variable from the regressions and replaced it with domestic demand. Domestic demand is thought 
to capture two presumed assets of larger economies: a more vigorous consumption force and a greater 
ability to make large investments. The fact that it is not always significant can be explained by 
Germany’s idiosyncratic strategy resulting in a significant decrease in consumer spending as detailed 
in Section 2. The coefficient on the deficit gap is positive and significant, confirming our hypothesis. 
However, given the high correlation between the deficit gap and domestic demand (-0.69) as well as 
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TABLE 3 : PANEL DATA : DETERMINANTS OF GDP GROWTH IN LARGE COUNTRIES OF THE EURO ZONE, 1998-2008 
GLS with fixed effects regressions for panel data, robust to heteroscedasticity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Observations 33 30 30 30 30 
R
2 within 0.213 0.225 0.386 0.581 0.637 
sigma_u 7.710 10.84 19.30 11.20 15.11 
sigma_e 0.935 0.967 0.879 0.742 0.705 
rho 0.985 0.992 0.998 0.996 0.998 
t statistics in parentheses, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; Data: Eurostat. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for small countries: the country size effect bears an even larger coefficient, 
hinting at a stronger ‘size advantage’; comparatively to large countries and as expected, openness is 
more significant (here, domestic demand proves insignificant and is therefore dropped from the 
regressions); but the hypothesis that their larger inflation rates foster their growth is not confirmed by 
regressions 4 and 5. On closer inspection of the data, it seems that small euro zone economies tend to 
go through episodes of short-lived inflationary growth (ie inflation soars with high growth rates, and in 
the next period high inflation eats up growth). The Economist (“Dangers ahead”, February 16
th 2008), 
assessing the repercussions of the American recession on the European economy, noted that “the parts 
of the economy that are most exposed to non euro zone demand are doing better than those that rely on 
domestic spending”, confirming our arguments. This statement also implies that euro zone small 
countries are more apt to withstand recession than the bigger ones, defeating both the ideas that 
dependence on exports make small countries more vulnerable to unpropitious international conditions 
and that bigger countries had “the domestic firepower to withstand a recession in America.” 
 
TABLE 4 : PANEL DATA : DETERMINANTS OF GDP GROWTH IN SMALL COUNTRIES OF THE EURO ZONE, 1998-2008 
GLS with fixed effects regressions for panel data, robust to heteroscedasticity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Observations 118 116 116  75  75 
R
2  within 0.124 0.174 0.190 0.495 0.528 
sigma_u 18.01 21.70 17.25 19.94 27.27 
sigma_e 1.436 1.411 1.405 1.096 1.068 
rho 0.994 0.996 0.993 0.997 0.998 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 




Having a separate “medium sized” category for Spain proved a posteriori sensible. Though Spain does 
not exactly fit the large euro zone country profile, a regression including the “three big” and Spain was 
run so as to rely on more observations. The R
2 dropped slightly; the significance results were roughly 
the same: the coefficient on size was less negative and the inflation gap coefficient changed signs 
without gaining significance. The inclusion of Spain in the small countries regression proved even less 
appropriate: R
2 dropped to a maximum 0.35, population and trade openness lost any significance 
except in the third model while the significance of the inflation gap was boosted. These result confirm 
that Spain falls into a size category of its own, sharing with the large countries a weaker reliance on 
exports and displaying inflationary growth as is the case of several smaller countries, but having 
overall economic structures pertaining neither to small or large economies. 
 
Table 5 presents a comparison of the regression coefficients in terms of range and significance: Since 
the coefficients in the FE model regression are constrained across units, comparing regression 
coefficients obtained for large countries and small countries is a good way to check the empirical 
incidence of country size on economic performance. While coefficients always bear the same sign for 
both groups, there still are a number of sizeable differences. As far as population is concerned (our 
proxy for country size), it seems to have an more negative impact on growth for our eleven small 
countries that for the large ones, confirming an advantage to micro-states in the likes of Luxembourg, 
Malta and so forth. Trade openness yields the best significance results and the coefficient on it is 
larger for the small countries. Domestic demand displays no significant coefficient for small countries 
and a moderate positive impact on the growth variations in large ones.  
 
TABLE  5 : COMPARISON OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS : RANGE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
  Large countries  Small countries Eurozone  (15  countries) 
Population  [-1.367***; -0.576*]  [-7.758***;-3.495*]  [-0.748**-0.342*] 
Trade Openness  0.0524** [0.0397*;0.0874**]  [0.0514**;  0.0798***] 
Domestic Demand  [0.229*;0.347**]  No significance  0.215* 
Output per 1000km2  2.873** 1.434**  -1.431** 
Inflation Gap  No significance  [-0.664***;-0.662***]  0.542*** 
Deficit Gap  [0.633**;0.742*] No  significance  0.386* 
Sigma_u  [7.710;15.11]  [17.25;27.27]  [11.28-20.08] 
 
 
Our measure for territorial efficiency has a positive and significant coefficient in both small and large 
countries regressions and a negative sign in the common one. This is partly explainable by the fact, 
that as we have seen in Section 1, this variable does not have a linear relationship with size, as large 
countries are more territorially efficient than some small countries still catching up with their 
European counterparts. The most interesting differences are in the inflation and deficit gaps. Overall, 
inflation does not seem to be much related to growth fluctuations (correlation coefficient -0.3081). On COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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closer inspection however, there is a strong positive correlation in small countries between growth and 
future (at t+1) inflation (0.5751). Indeed for new entrant countries or some that have been catching up 
(most notoriously Ireland), either the Balassa-Samuelson effect has been at play or rapid growth has 
fuelled inflation. In large countries the between inflation and growth is negative but small (-0.2774), 
the coefficient on the inflation gap is not significant, so that we cannot make strong assumptions in 
this regard. If anything, the correlation between past inflation and present growth is larger (-0.4312), 
hinting at a possible braking role of inflation on growth. Different interaction mechanisms between 
growth and inflation in large and small countries of the euro zone thus seem at play, and the existence 
of an inflation externality generated by small countries is empirically confirmed, even if it does not 
appear to buoy up their growth. Turning now to the deficit gap, the analysis is reversed: no 
significance as well as low correlation levels with past and future values of the deficit with growth are 
found for small countries, in line with the expectation that these countries rely on external and not 
domestic demand for their growth. For large countries (notwithstanding multicolinearity between the 
deficit gap and domestic demand as explained earlier), on the contrary the present and past deficits are 
positively correlated with growth (at the respective levels of 0.4090 and 0.5135), thus corroborating 
our domestic demand based growth argument.  
Notwithstanding that we can only identify correlations and not directly causational effects; country 
size seems to have a sizeable explanatory power in accounting for growth differences in the euro 
zone
9. Our analysis encompasses components of growth and corroborates that the economic structures 
of small countries seem more apt to foster growth in the framework of the euro zone. By and large, the 
econometric results also confirm our assumptions about the differentiated effect of the euro zone 
economic government. Namely, regarding inflation, virtue, in the monetarist sense of the term, has 
little effect in large countries and seems to dampen growth in small ones. No strong justification for 
the deficit limits with regards to national growth rates is found as deficit appears conducive to growth 
in large countries and has no effect in small ones.  
Nevertheless when we introduce country and time effects, the estimated pair wise correlations exhibit 
less significance in a complex panel data analysis. One way to improve the reliability of our 
econometric results would be to temporally widen our data set: gathering data for the last fifty years 
would allow us to assess the effects of European integration on the relationship between country size 
and growth strategies and see whether the implementation of the euro zone has had significant effects 
in that matter. Additionally, extending the number of years included in our data set would enable us to 
run seemingly unrelated panel regressions (SUR) and so relax the homogeneity assumptions on the 
regression coefficients of the fixed effects estimation.  
Country effects (measured by sigma_u) and their incidence on the total variance (measured by rho) are 
in all cases large, meaning that national peculiarities in the variables we control for play a great part in 
                                                            
9 The same regressions were run excluding the potential outliers that are Ireland and Luxembourg (small countries with 
very high growth rates over the decade) and yielded roughly the same significance levels. COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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growth differences, and there are certainly other reasons possibly explaining economic performances, 
not taken into account in our analysis. There is for instance a national responsibility in conducting or 
not reforms, using economic policies to cater to re-election purposes, etc, that cannot be blamed on 
flawed EMU institutional design.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Country size determines a number of economic structures; in particular greater openness is to be 
observed in smaller countries and heavier reliance on internal demand in larger ones. In the context of 
the EMU and its economic rules, these features influence economic performance precisely because the 
“one-size-fits-all” rules are biased in favour of the growth strategies of small countries. One should 
indeed take stock of global demand when internalising externalities. This means for instance, taking 
into account small countries’ negative externalities in terms of inflation and not just large countries’ 
fiscal externalities. Ironically enough, Germany and France, two large countries, presided over the 
making of the monetary union and so bear a responsibility for their own disadvantaged economic fate 
in the euro zone. 
The financial crisis currently unfolding has been revealing of the effects of country size within the 
euro zone. The German refusal of a common rescue plan demonstrated again Germany’s reluctance to 
assume its de facto biggest power role. Ireland’s unilateral decision to raise guarantees on bank 
deposits and thus distorting competition illustrated some small countries’ new abilities to punch above 
their weight and go it alone, once they have entered the European Union. The crisis also highlighted 
the shelter role of the euro. Had it not been for its euro area membership, we may surmise that Ireland 
and other countries would have been in a much worse position as prove the fate of Hungary or Iceland 
and also the second-thoughts countries like Sweden or Denmark are giving to euro adhesion.  
The emergence of a ‘size divide’ within the euro zone is confirmed by a thorough econometric 
analysis, also led separately for large and small countries. Enlarging the time scope of the data would 
be useful to assess comparatively the effects of the monetary union and so be the object of another 
paper. 
The fact that large countries are economically disadvantaged by the workings of the EMU is a problem 
for the euro zone as a whole. Harming members representing together 70% of the area’s GDP, as well 
as absorbing a substantial share of other euro zone economies’ exports will eventually also hurt 
smaller economies. Under such a scenario, the euro zone won’t be able to live up to its role as a key 
international economic power and the euro will also lose some of its international appeal.  
Finally, it is sensible to extend our analysis of the impact of country size to the enlargement of the 
euro zone. Integration is a ‘shrinking process’, and with each enlargement, relative sizes of Member 
States within the monetary union diminish. Another factor affecting country size is demographic 
change. Indeed, if the population of some euro zone countries is on the wane, while that of others COUNTRY SIZE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EURO ZONE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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grows, in the long run the relative sizes of Member States will change. Does this mean that size effects 
will evolve, bringing about new economic policy constraints? This question remains to be 
investigated. What remains certain is that euro zone membership is clearly more propitious to small 
countries and it should not come as a surprise, if among the new Member States, the bigger three 
(Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) are the more reluctant to introduce the euro soon, while 
smaller ones have already entered the zone. 
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APPENDIX B : 
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APPENDIX C : 
TABLE 6 : PANEL DATA: DETERMINANTS OF GDP GROWTH IN THE EURO ZONE, 1998-2008 
GLS with fixed effects regressions for panel data with time effetcs, robust to heteroscedasticity 
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Observations 119 108  75  30 
R
2 within 0.765 0.656 0.807 0.952 
sigma_u 3.675 3.700 10.64 6.441 
sigma_e 0.698 0.821 0.744 0.332 
rho 0.965 0.953 0.995 0.997 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; Data: Eurostat. 